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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
giving the states an opportunity to enact their own laws and creating
greater certainty in the application of the Due Process Clause.
FRANK H. HARVEy, JR.
WRONGFUL DEATH- ACTIONS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE
SOLE BENEFICIARY
Recently the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous holding that
when the only eligible beneficiary who sustained pecuniary damage by
reason of decedent's death dies during a wrongful death action,' the trial
court may direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground that there re-
mains no statutory beneficiary for whom the action can be maintained.2
In the instant case the court followed its earlier decision in Doyle v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 3 wherein it was held that the sole beneficiary dies
possessed of a right of action only, which, unlike a judgment, is not a prop-
erty right that would pass to his heirs or next of kin. There was no conten-
tion in the Doyle case that the death of the sole beneficiary abated the
action.4 The court held that since there was no living statutory beneficiary,
the action could no longer be maintained; 5 that the wrongful death statute
did not allow the beneficiaries' rights to descend to others not expressly
nominated by the statute; and that the purpose of the statute was to com-
pensate the beneficiary only for the pecuniary injury sustained because of
the alleged wrongful death.
The dissent found the instant case an opportunity to overrule the Doyle
case and to adopt a more liberal construction of the wrongful death statute
found in other jurisdictions,6 as exemplified by the rationale of the case of
Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., Inc.7 That case held that the death of the
sole beneficiary does not abate the suit, but that the administrator may con-
tinue it for the recovery of the beneficiary's loss up to the moment of his
death, although not for anything thereafter. The dissent concluded that
the result reached by the majority makes "the beneficiary's right to recover
dependent on her ability to outlive extended litigation.'"s
If the sole beneficiary of a wrongful death action dies while the suit is
pending, the personal representative of the person wrongfully killed does
not continue the action for the benefit of the mother or the collateral heirs
but for the estate of the deceased beneficiary. Although the beneficiary is
not alive to benefit from a judgment, should not his estate be enriched at
least to the extent of the amount of loss suffered by the decedent-beneficiary
during his lifetime?'
Any policy whereby the defendant is discharged from liability would
seemingly defeat the legislative purpose of requiring the wrongdoer to
compensate the beneficiary for the pecuniary injury sustained by him. As
stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court: " . .. the death of the beneficiary
pending suit cannot be made available to abrogate the liability of the
(Slimmer
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wrongdoer incurred for pecuniary injury already sustained. '10 By reading
the Ohio wrongful death statutes" it is seen that the legislature contem-
plated that there could be a settlement. The decision of the instant case,
however, disfavors settlement and encourages defendants to refuse to settle
and to delay suit in the hope that the sole beneficiary will fail to survive the
litigation. This is particularly true when the benificiary is elderly or ia
bad health.
The majority opinion in the instant case frankly admits that if it were
'OIo REV. CODE § 2125.01 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 10509-166). This section gives
an independent right of action for the death of a person by reason of the wrongful
act, neglect or default of another. Ohio Revised Code Section 2125.02 (Ohio Gen-
eral Code Section 10509-167) provides that such an action shall be brought in the
name of the personal representative of the decedent for the exclusive benefit of the
surviving spouse, the children and other next of kin of the decedent who have suf-
fered pecuniary injury as a result of such death.
2Danis v. New York Cent. RR., 160 Ohio St. 474, 117 N.E.2d 39 (1954).
'81 Ohio St. 184, 90 NE. 165 (1909).
'See Osuo REv. CODE § 2311.21 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 11397). See Simons v.
Kidd, 41 N.W.2d 840, 846 (S.D. 1950). This case is cited in the majority opinion
in the instant case as upholding the Doyle case. But the basis of the decision in the
Simons case was that the property right formerly held by the beneficiary abated by
reason of its failure to come within the survival statute in that state. In the Doyle
case, however, it was expressly contended that the action did not abate but that there
was no statutory beneficiary for whom to continue the action.
3See OHIo REv. CODE § 2125.02 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 10509-167).
'Waldo v. Goodsell, 33 Conn. 432 (1866); Frazier v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co.,
101 Ga. 77, 28 S.E. 662 (1897); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarty's Adm'r, 169
Ky. 38, 183 S.W. 237 (1916); DeMarco v. Pease, 253 Mass. 499, 149 N.E. 208
(1925); Johnston v. Bay State St. Ry. Co., 22 Mass. 583, 111 N.E. 391 (1916);
Cooper v. Shore Elec. Co., 63 N.J.L. 558, 44 At. 633 (1899); Matter of Meekin v.
B.H.R.R., 164 N.Y. 145, 58 N.E. 50 (1900); Sider v. Gen. Elec. Co., 238 N.Y. 64,
143 N.E. 792 (1924); Shawnee v. Cheek, 41 Old. 227, 137 Pac. 724 (1913);
Fitzgerald v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 207 Pa. 118, 56 At. 350 (1903).
"300 U.S. 342, 57 Sup. Ct. 452 (1937).
'Danis v. New York Cent. R., 160 Ohio St. 474, 480, 117 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1954).
One reason given in the Van Beeck case for contrary opinions which hold that the
action does abate is that at times the interval between the wrongful death and the
death of the beneficiary was so short that the courts overlooked that there had been a
pecuniary loss during that interval. In the principal case the alleged wrongful death
occurred eight years before the death of the beneficiary and in the Doyle case there
was an interval of twenty-one years.
'See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 57 Sup. Ct. 452 (19'37); Od-
livak v. Elliott, 82 F. Supp. 609 (D. Del. 1949); Dotsie v. Lewiston Crushed Stone
Co., 136 Me. 284, 8 A.2d 393 (1939); Sider v. Gen. Elec. Co., 238 N.Y. 64, 143
N.E. 792 (1924).
ID Cooper v. Shore Elec. Co., 63 N.J.L. 558, 566, 44 Ad. 633, 636 (1899).
UOMIO REV. CODE § 2125.02 (Omo GEN. CODE § 10509-167): "... Such per-
sonal representative, if he was appointed in this state, with consent of the court mak-
ing such appointment may... settle with the defendant the amount to be paid."
The Doyle case was decided in 1909.
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